“…the entry of zoe into the sphere of the polis—the politicization of bare life as such—constitutes the decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought. It is even likely that if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity.” (Agamben, Homo Sacer 4)’
I am interested in trying to ask what the implications of Agamben’s philosophy may be for feminist thinking. When was the turning point for Agamben’s “modernity”? How is it that the structure of sovereignty in modern democracy has politicized woman’s body from the perspective of Irigaray’s Woman? From the perspective of the objectivization of power via biopolitics, the body is that which consolidates power into greater units such that this consolidation requires a separation of the body, wherein the subject must be inoculated against the negativity of his own death via the suspension of what qualifies him human. The man who lives under the regime of biopower is not permitted to think death as a political marker which organizes existence. That which has typically adorned the unintelligible, and that which has previously provided the upper limit of thinking for man, no longer qualifies political life. Instead, the subject now exists in a state of suspension between life and death, no longer able to be “subjectivated” by either within the normal structure of the polis.
There is a double structure here, one of the bios and one of the impossible. The question that runs through Agamben’s book is what is the inclusion of politics in the impossible such that there is no distinction between the two? The state of the impossible is the ban, whereby the impossible is rendered in its full capacity as lived. The impossible, the very limitation of man—death, is incorporated into the structure of biopolitics as a bidding of the sovereign. So that which was impossible to bear under traditional strictures of life, the mark of death, now becomes integral to living it. What are the implications of bios for that which is impossible to render about the human? The point which Agamben makes about the inclusion of zoe in the polis does not mean that the human is indefinitely reduced to zoe. The originary ban which is the jurido-political content of existence must operate materially, though it is entirely topological. Where this shifts the frontier of warfare though, is to the oikos itself, where biopolitcal warfare now opens up a zone of indistinction between the public and the private. The question is now no longer who is the enemy. We full well know that we are hosts of the oppressors. The question is now rather, how might I extricate myself from a political structure which assures me my life, but robs me of what qualifies it as livable?